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Abstract—In big data systems, the infrastructure is such that large amounts of data are hosted away from the users. In such a system
information security is considered as a major challenge. From a customer perspective, one of the big risks in adopting big data systems
is in trusting the provider who designs and owns the infrastructure from accessing user data. Yet there does not exist much in the
literature on detection of insider attacks. In this work, we propose a new system architecture in which insider attacks can be detected
by utilizing the replication of data on various nodes in the system. The proposed system uses a two-step attack detection algorithm and
a secure communication protocol to analyze processes executing in the system. The first step involves the construction of control
instruction sequences for each process in the system. The second step involves the matching of these instruction sequences among
the replica nodes. Initial experiments on real-world hadoop and spark tests show that the proposed system needs to consider only 20%
of the code to analyze a program and incurs 3.28% time overhead. The proposed security system can be implemented and built for any
big data system due to its extrinsic workflow.
Index Terms—Big Data, Security, Intrusion Detection, Insider Attacks, Control Flow.
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1 INTRODUCTION
B IG data solutions are widely adopted across variousgovernment and enterprise domains such as software,
finance, retail and healthcare. Big data applications are
pioneering in the field of advanced data analytics and have a
projected market of approximately 50 billion dollars by 2018.
The most frequent use-cases of big data are information
retrieval from complex, unstructured data; and real time
data analysis [1]. Along with its rapid market growth, the
big data trend also has its share of challenges and risks.
In an era where extracting information from data is sanc-
tioned to all, users are understandably more skeptical to let
providers host their data away from them. This, along with
the recent increase in the number of cyber attacks, boosted
the importance for security. Yet, the losses due to boundless
security holes in existing systems seem to overshadow the
investments towards increasing their security. Hence, there
is an immediate need to address architectural loopholes
in order to provide better security. For instance, current
big data security platforms focus on providing fine-grained
security through extensive analysis of stored data. But such
models indirectly facilitate the abuse of user data in the
hands of the provider.
Insider attacks are becoming more common and are
considered the toughest attacks to detect [2]. There does not
exist much in the literature on solutions for insider attacks
in general [3]. Though privacy and security are touted to
be important problems in the big data world, the solutions
concentrate only on leveraging big data systems for efficient
security in other domains. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no robust solution for detecting or preventing in-
sider threats within big data infrastructures. For example,
security mechanisms of popular big data systems such as
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Hadoop [4] and Spark [5] include third-party applications
such as Kerberos [6], access control lists (ACL), log monitor-
ing and data encryption (to some extent). But for an insider,
especially a traitor, circumventing these mechanisms is not
difficult [7]. It is crucial to address the problem of insider
attacks in big data systems for three main reasons: (a) traitor
within the provider’s organization will be able to circum-
vent the security system in place (b) sensitivity of customer
information stored in the system is increasing by day; and
(c) there is no consensus or widespread agreement on well-
defined security standards in the big data community.
Recently, two unauthorized backdoors were discovered
in Juniper Networks firewalls that might have given attack-
ers access to highly classified information. Some important
facts about this particular hack are: (a) it comes at the cost
of compromising national security (b) it shows that even a
major network security company is vulnerable to attacks (c)
in spite of the high stakes and vast resources, it is believed
that these backdoors were left undiscovered for almost 3
years; and (d) it was reported that the attackers could have
deleted the security logs [8]. This is one of the many exam-
ples to show that the efficiency of common attack prevention
techniques, such as identity management, ACLs and data
encryption, is necessary but sufficient to prevent attacks. As
per OpenSOC, in 60% of breaches data gets stolen within
hours of the breach and 54% of breaches are not discovered
for months [9]. This indicates that infrastructures need to
have efficient attack detection techniques along with strong
attack prevention techniques for robust security.
In the big data world, it is considered that moving com-
putation to where the data resides is better than the tradi-
tional approach of moving data for computation. The main
features of big data infrastructures are fast data process-
ing, high scalability, high availability and fault-tolerance.
Availability and fault-tolerance of big data systems comes
from intelligent replication of data. This implies SIMD style,
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2parallel execution of the same program at multiple locations.
When a program is scheduled for execution on the big data
cluster, it runs as an individual process on every data node
that hosts a copy of the program data. The replication of
data on various nodes in the big data system can be utilized
in providing security. Security for a computing system can
be implemented at hardware and software level. Given the
advantage of isolation that can be achieved at hardware
level security, we propose delegating security to special
purpose hardware, such as TPM [10] and TXT [11] chips,
that reside on the nodes of the big data cluster. Such an
infrastructure will have the advantages of (a) performing
security analysis remotely (b) reducing the overhead on
main processor by delegating security, and (c) significantly
decrease the cost of data transfer while providing efficient
security techniques such as isolated vulnerability scanning
through program profiling.
In this paper, we propose a system architecture for
attack detection in big data systems that can efficiently
detect insider attacks. Our proposed system uses a two
step algorithm for attack detection. First, program profiling
is performed by individual nodes of the big data cluster on
the processes they execute. In this step, process binaries of
scheduled processes are disassembled and analyzed to gen-
erate control instruction sequences (CIS). These sequences
are then hashed, encrypted and shared among data nodes
that host the same data i.e. primary and replica nodes.
Next, consensus among data nodes is achieved regarding the
possibility of a process being attacked. This step involves
two phases: hash matching and information sharing. Upon
receiving encrypted messages from primary nodes, the
replica nodes apply sequential, on-demand string matching
between the locally generated hash and the received hash.
Next, the result of this comparison is shared with the pri-
mary node. Depending on the results received, the primary
data node notifies the master node to take necessary recov-
ery measures. All communications among data nodes are
performed using a secure communication protocol that is based
on public-private key encryption. Our main contributions
are as follows:
• We propose a novel extrinsic workflow for security in
big data systems using control instruction sequences
(CIS), hash matching and encrypted communication.
• We suggest using a one-shot program profiling tech-
nique that builds instruction-level CIS from the na-
tive code of scheduled processes.
• We endorse the idea of having security as an inde-
pendent module in big data systems by designing
a system architecture for detecting insider attacks in
big data systems.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a
primer on insider attacks in general purpose computing.
This section also discusses the current security methods
in big data and some related works. Section 3 describes
our attack model. The proposed system which includes
the two step attack detection algorithm and the secure
communication protocol are explained in Section 4. A model
of the proposed system with a list of required components
is also given in this section. Section 5 shows the impact and
usefulness of the proposed security system architecture by
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Fig. 1. Entities and Relationships in Insider Attacks
conducting real-world experiments on Hadoop and Spark
clusters. Finally, section 6 draws the conclusion and outlines
future work.
2 BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
This section gives a primer on insider attacks and their
solutions in general purpose computing and discusses the
current security mechanisms available in the big data world.
Also, the various related works are briefly described here.
2.1 Insider Attacks
Though security in general computing has been extensively
studied and implemented over the years, computers are still
vulnerable to attacks. Software based attacks that typically
target a computer network or system, called cyberattacks,
are growing in their frequency and impact. The plot for any
type of software attack involves exploitation of a piece of
code that runs on a computer. It is inherent to this per-
spective about a cyberattack that security can be provided
at two levels: (a) by the software that is used to compile
and execute the program; and (b) by the hardware that
runs the program. Providing security at software level gives
more context and information about the target programs
that are being protected. But this comes with the risk of
the security software itself being compromised. On the
other hand, having security at hardware level gives more
isolation to the process of analyzing and securing programs
though it becomes difficult to give detailed context about the
programs and the infrastructures running them. In any case,
the toughest software attacks to counter are the ones whose
genesis is intentional and are performed by those who have
a good understanding of the underlying system.
Based on our literature review, we have identified four
major questions that can guide towards better handling of
insider attacks: (a) who can perform these attacks? (b) what
gets affected? (c) how to detect these attacks? and (d) how
to prevent them from happening? Figure 1 gives a list of
entities to consider when dealing with insider attacks. The
figure also shows the four questions, from above, as relation-
ships among the entities. Insider attacks can be performed
by (a) traitors who are legally a part of the system but want
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to misuse the access privileges given to them; (b) masquer-
aders who get access to the system by stealing identities of
those who have legitimate access. Insider attacks can affect
the proper functionality of a program or corrupt the data
used by the programs. Profiling and trapping are two most
common ways to detect insider attacks [3], [12]. Profiling can
be performed (a) at the program level [13] and at the user
level [14]. Traps can be set in the programs or in the network
to force the attacker into performing certain actions that
help towards exposing the attack [15]. The biggest concern
with these insider attack detection methods is the possibility
of losing valuable data. Hence, insider attack prevention
mechanisms such as identity management [16], [17], access
control lists [6], [18], data encryption [19], [20] etc must be
employed at the same time.
In this work, we are more interested in Control Flow
Integrity (CFI) [21], [22] which is another popular and
effective technique for attack prevention which enforces the
execution of a program to follow a path that belongs to
the program’s control flow graph. The set of possible paths
are determined ahead of time using static CFG [21], [22]. A
coarse-grained or fine-grained version of CFI can be used for
program profiling. But the problem with any such profiling
techniques is the overhead incurred in conducting them,
even more if performed remotely. Though such limitations
of this approach have been identified [23], it is accepted as a
strong and stable security enforcing mechanism. There are a
plethora of CFG-based code similarity algorithms [24]. But
such CFG similarity check methods are complex, expensive,
have no defined standards. Most CFG similarity algorithms
rely on some simplification techniques such as fingerprints,
edit distance, comparison only with known graphs in a
database etc. Also, the impact of CFG similarity analysis dif-
fers a lot depending on when and how the CFG is generated
for a program. These complexities and uncertainties led to a
new set of control flow analysis techniques that avoid trans-
lating the program code to a formal model. For example,
insider attack detection based on symbolic execution and
model-checking of assembly code was proposed in [25]. In
this work, we propose a novel approach for control flow
similarity check for attack detection that totally discards the
idea of building CFGs. Instead, our idea is based on simple
string matching of control instruction sequences obtained
from assembly code of scheduled processes.
Insider attacks are a dangerous security problem in any
domain because they are difficult to predict and detect [12].
Hence organizations must try to safe guard their systems
and data from insider attacks [26]. Predictive models for
user/program/network behavior with the help of contin-
uous monitoring is a widely adopted solution for insider
attack detection. But such prediction is not completely reli-
able and the difficulty in detecting attacks grows with the
complexity of the underlying system. Recent advancements
in computing led to wide adoption of services such as
cloud computing and big data which are extremely com-
plex in their design and development. In cloud computing,
many insider attacks can be performed by misleading the
client side services and once compromised, data obtained
can provide social engineering opportunities for cascade
attacks [27]. Having security as a service model for cloud
environments [28] and having sealed clouds [29] are some
ideas proposed towards protecting cloud infrastructures
from insider attacks. While cloud computing is more about
computing on the fly, big data deals with organizing and
managing large sets of data. Insider attack detection and
prevention for big data frameworks is an area that is not
well explored yet.
2.2 Security in Big Data
Security in big data is gaining tremendous momentum in
both research and industry. But big data security is over-
whelmingly inclined towards leveraging big data’s poten-
tial in providing security for other systems [30]. Security
within big data systems is still a budding phenomenon. It
is ideal to include security as a major component in the
holistic view of big data systems. But the requirements
of big data applications such as real-time data processing,
fault tolerance and continuous availability give little scope
to employ complex and robust security mechanisms. All
existing security techniques implemented within big data
frameworks are software based and try to prevent external
entities from attacking the system. For example, the main
requirements in hadoop security design focus only on access
4control [31]. Big data systems encourage software based
fine-grained security mechanisms such as Kerberos; access
control lists (ACL); log monitoring etc. Big data security is
inclined towards specifying multi-level access rights: user
level, application level and data level. Advantages of having
such simple software oriented security mechanisms, such as
Kerberos, are better performance and simple management.
But there are various problems with such a policy enforcing
security software, as identified in [32] and [33]. Also, none
of these approaches can strongly counter insider attacks.
According to Hadoop Security Design [31], permissible
performance overhead for a change in architecture is only
3%. This is precisely the reason behind coarse-grained secu-
rity mechanisms such as data encryption being an optional
and restricted feature in big data systems. Data encryption
in hadoop is only available for data that gets exchanged
between user and the system but not for data that travels
within the system. Randomized data encryption for data
security was proposed in [34] but this work acknowledges
that faster results are yet to be achieved. Also, big data
properties such as large scale distributed infrastructures
and replication make it difficult to detect insider attacks
precisely using the traditional methods. In this work, we
demonstrate the inefficiency of existing big data security
mechanisms by implementing two insider attacks on a big
data cluster. Figure 2 shows two workflows we used to
successfully implement an insider attack in a hadoop big
data cluster. This paper only discusses the workflow of the
attacks but a detailed report on the results of these attacks
can be found in our previous work [7].
2.2.1 Manipulating Activity Logs
The first attack, as shown in Figure 2a, manipulates log data
in order to produce erroneous results during log analysis.
Flume and Kakfa are two popular big data products for real-
time event processing. Most big data analysis and security
solutions tend to use these services within their framework.
Hortonworks tutorial [35] shows how a system admin will
be able to detect distributed DOS attacks on the hadoop
cluster by analyzing the server log data. Interestingly, this
tutorial can be used as a counterexample to show that admin
can act as a traitor, manipulate the server log data and create
results that depict a wrong picture to the higher administra-
tion. As per the workflow in this example, users requests
the client service to access data stored in HDFS. These user
requests will all be logged by the log4j service. Hence, any
attackers requests will also be logged. The system admin
can easily build a framework with the help of services such
as Flume, Hive and Hcatalog to monitor and track the user
requests. A small script that filters the streaming data going
from Flume to Hive can be induced by an insider to script
the results according to the insider’s choice.
2.2.2 Deleting Edit Log
The second attack, as shown in Figure 2b, deletes the
contents of editlog such that user data gets deleted even-
tually. A system admin who has access to the secondary
namenode in a hadoop cluster can implement this attack.
Namenode is the focal point (and a single point of failure)
of a HDFS file system. It stores the metadata of all files
in HDFS along with their storage locations in a data blob
called the fsImage. Editlogs, along with fsImage, are updated
periodically such that the namenode has access to up to date
information about data stored in the hadoop cluster. To save
time and computation energy on the namenode, this process
is performed off-site on secondary namenode, sometimes
called the checkpoint node and the output fsImage is directly
dumped on to the namenode. Hence, manipulating edit log
content will reflect, by the next checkpoint, on the fsImage
which will be used by the namenode for job allocation and
scheduling. This is a weak point in the hadoop architecture
that can be misused easily by insiders. Figure 2b shows the
workflow for checkpoint-ing in a hadoop cluster and how
an insider can introduce a script to delete user data forever.
In the most extreme case, if an insider induces a small script
that completely wipes out the editlog, the fsImage will be
empty at the next checkpoint.
Finally, proposing hardware oriented security methods
for hadoop are on the rise in recent times. A TPM based
authentication protocol for hadoop was proposed by [36]
which claims to be much faster than Kerberos, though it has
not been fully implemented. A hardware oriented security
method to create trusted Apache Hadoop Distributed File
System (HDFS) was proposed in [37] which is a theoreti-
cally novel concept but was proven to work only on one
node. The overhead of data encryption by TPM acts as a
hindrance in adopting this method, especially when the size
of data maintained in big data systems is ever growing.
In this work, we propose the delegation of security in big
data systems by designing an independent system with the
necessary components.
3 ATTACK MODEL
Our attack model focuses on misuse of log data by system
admins of a big data platform. Security features such as
data confidentiality and operational guarantees such as
correctness of results can be compromised because of such
misuse. The goals of an insider conducting such attacks can
vary from personal vendetta to financial gain. The proposed
system targets such specific insider attacks because they
are easy to implement with existing security solutions on
platforms such as Hadoop and Spark. Attacks targeting
misuse of log data can be performed by creating malicious
programs or by modifying of existing program binaries
with malicious intent. Given the existing security features
of user-level activity monitoring, we exclude the possibility
of system admins writing new malicious programs from the
scope of our attack model. Instead, our attack model focuses
on system admins being able to modify binaries of existing
programs. Our goal is to spot vulnerabilities in code that
can be exploited by insiders. We acknowledge that insider
attacks are too broad and not all of them can be mitigated by
the proposed solution. There can be other possible insider
attacks in big data that are not visible at compile time and
the proposed system may or may not be able to detect.
4 PROPOSED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section we explain the proposed system in detail.
Figure 3 shows the proposed system that includes a secure
communication protocol and a two step attack detection
5algorithm. The first step in the attack detection algorithm is
process profiling, which is conducted locally and indepen-
dently at each node to identify possible attacks. In the next
step is hash matching and consensus, which is conducted
by replica data nodes to conclude about the authenticity of
a possible attack.
4.1 Secure Communication Protocol
A big data system is technically a distributed data storage
system that relies on secure and efficient communication
protocols for data transfer. The proposed system aims to
provide robust security for big data systems by having a
modular design and being independent from the core big
data services. For this reason, a separate secure communi-
cation protocol is included in the proposed system design
that can be isolated from the set of default communication
protocols used by the big data system. The proposed system
is a mix of independent security modules that work together
and reside on individual nodes of the system. These mod-
ules use the secure communication protocol to share packets
of data with their counterparts on other nodes of the cluster.
The data shared among the security modules in our
system architecture contain vital information about the anal-
ysis of a process. Hence, we propose using a public key
cryptosystem in our secure communication protocol. All
data transferred by any node using this secure commu-
nication channel is encrypted upfront using private key
encryption and hardcoded keys that are not accessible to
anyone. The associated public key will be shared with all
other replica nodes that a data node need to communicate
with. Hardware security chips such as TPM [10] or Intel’s
TXT [11] have public-private key encryption modules. Such
hardware security chips come with a hardcoded, on-chip
master key. A simple random number generator module
is used to generate public-private key pairs periodically
using the hardwired master key. For this work, we relied
on SSH protocol for secure communication using RSA for
key exchange but any such cryptosystem will work. Given
the off chance of leakage of private keys, a key pair is held
active for only a certain time period T . This increases the
robustness of the communication protocol. In this work, we
did not focus on finding the perfect value for T but assumed
it to be a predefined value of 1 second. The public key of a
node is shared with all other nodes it has to communicate
with i.e. replica nodes and master node. All incoming data
packets to a node will be encrypted with its current public
key and can only be decrypted using the corresponding
private key that is stored locally. Decrypted information will
be sent to the process matching module to identify attacks.
Given the short lifespan of public keys used in our secure
communication protocol, each node should be able to store
public keys of all other nodes it has to communicate with.
Also, storing older keys of other nodes helps in verifying
authenticity of nodes in case of attack recovery. Hence, we
propose to use queue data structures on every node to
store the periodically generated public keys of other nodes.
Back of queuen will be the latest public key to be used
for encrypting packets to be sent to node n while front of
queuen will be deleted when queuen is full (to accommodate
a new key). Limiting the maximum queue size by some
Algorithm 1 Secure Communication Protocol
while true do
if time = T then
for all n ∈ OtherNodes do
newkpn ← get new public private key pair (TPM )
pubn ← get public key from newkpn
privn ← get private key from newkpn
noden ← send(pubn)
arrpriv[n]← privn
end for
for all n ∈ OtherNodes do
if queuen full then
dequeue(queuen)
end if
queuen ← enqueue(pubn)
arrpub[n]← queuen
end for
end if
end while
msg to be sent to all replicas
for all r ∈ Replicas do
pubr ← back(arrpub[n])
msge ← encrypt(msg, pubr)
send(msge)
end for
k will make sure that a node has enough information to
support attack recovery measures while not consuming too
much memory. Again, we did not focus on finding the
perfect value for k but used a predefined value of 3 while
conducting our experiments.
Algorithm 1 shows the steps involved in the proposed
secure communication protocol. Once a model of the pro-
posed system is installed, all nodes will periodically gener-
ate public-private key pairs for as long as the system is in
use. This is accomplished with the help of the hardwired
key on the special purpose security chip and the random
number generator module. At the end of every T time
units, a new public-private key (newkpn) is generated on
a node for communicating with replica node n. The private
key privn of newkpn will be used for decrypting incoming
data from node n and the public key pubn of newkpn will
be shared with node n. For ease of access to keys during
decryption, current private keys of all nodes are stored in
an array arrpriv[]. Once a public key pubn is shared with
node n, all incoming messages from node n will only be
decrypted using the associated privn for the next T time
units. An array of queues, arrpub[], is used to store public
keys received from all other nodes. When a node has to send
an messagemsg to replica nodes, the public key of that node
is used to create an encrypted message msge.
4.2 Detection Algorithm
The main part of the proposed system is the attack detection
algorithm which will be explained in this subsection. Our
attack detection algorithm is a two step process: process
profiling (step 1) and consensus through hash matching
(step 2).
6Attack Notification
Master Node
Primary 
Data Node
Secondary
Data Node
messages
SCP
• Send/Receive
• Message Queue
PP
• CFI Filter
• Instruction 
Sequences
• Encrypt
HM&C
• Decrypt
• Match strings
• Notify
Fig. 3. Proposed System Architecture for Detecting Insider Attacks in Big Data Systems
Algorithm 2 Process Profiling
while true do
procnew ← get newly scheduled process
code← get assembly code from HotSpotV M(procnew)
for all instr ∈ code do
if instr ∈ jump then
seqjump ← add instr to sequence of jumps
end if
if instr ∈ call then
seqcall ← add instr to sequence of calls
end if
if instr ∈ return then
seqreturn ← add instr to sequence of returns
end if
end for
seqarray ← add seqjump
seqarray ← add seqcall
seqarray ← add seqreturn
for all seq ∈ seqarray do
hashseq ← get hash from sha(seq)
hashhashes ← add hashseq
end for
msg ← get hash from sha(hashhashes)
send msg using Secure Communication Protocol
end while
4.2.1 Step 1: Process Profiling
Traditionally vulnerability scanning is performed away
from the source program’s execution domain to guarantee
isolation. Hence, the results of such scan must be communi-
cated back to the program. But this leads to a cost versus
isolation trade-off, depending on the remoteness of the
location used to perform the vulnerability scan. In big data
applications, the source program’s execution is distributed
across multiple nodes of the cluster. This makes it difficult
to implement techniques such as vulnerability scans on big
data systems. But big data infrastructures use replication of
data for high availability. This enforces the same program
to be run on multiple nodes that host the data required for
the program. We exploit this unique property of big data
systems and introduce a variation of CFI to create a novel
process profiling technique that can help in detecting insider
attacks in big data systems. Evans et al. [23] show that CFI,
either with limited number of tags or unlimited number of
tags, is not completely effective in attack prevention. Also,
CFI is usually based on CFG created from static analysis of
program code.
Most big data applications are packaged as jars that
run on Java Virtual Machines (JVM). These jars are not
completely compiled and do not convey much about the
program they represent. Hence, we do not use CFI on CFG’s
created using statistical code analysis. We propose to build
the control structure of a program from its corresponding
JVM output i.e. the assembly code of the Hotspot VM that
hosts the JVM. Since this is considered the final run-time
code that gets executed on the hardware, the control struc-
ture generated from the output of Hotspot VM is expected
to be less susceptible to software attacks compared to a CFG
generated from statistical analysis of program code. In the
context of big data platforms, this mitigates the possibility
of launching an attack on the entire cluster. Another major
variation from CFI in our process profiling technique is to
use individual control flow instruction sequences instead of
CFG paths. Control instructions dictate the control flow in a
program. Generating instruction sequences of such control
flow instructions from the assembly code output of hotspot
VM should technically give us all information a CFG can
provide in this context and avoid the complexity involved
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Algorithm 3 Hash Matching
while true do
msgp ← get message about process p from main copy
hashhashes(receivedp)← decrypt(msgnew, privk)
hashhashes(localp)← process− profile(p)
if hashhashes(receivedp) ∈ hashhashes(localp) then
confirmation← safe
else
confirmation← unsafe
end if
send(confirmation,main)
end while
in generating a CFG.
4.2.2 Step 2: Hash Matching and Consensus
The analyzer module in the proposed system creates
instruction sequences for jumps, calls and returns from the
JVM output of a given program (based on Intel’s Instruction
Set Architecture). Then, the SHA cryptographic hash func-
tion module is used to generate a fixed-length output for
each of the three instruction sequences. All three hashes are
combined and again given to the SHA cryptographic hash
function module to generate a final hash for the program.
This hash of hashes strengthens the uniqueness in identify-
ing a program. All programs that run on every node in the
cluster will follow the same routine. Encryption module of
the node with the primary copy of data uses currently active
public keys of replica nodes to encrypt the hash of hashes
and send it to the associated replica node. Hence, this node
acts as the coordinator for performing step 2 in the attack
detection algorithm.
Algorithm 2 shows the steps involved in the proposed
process profiling step. This algorithm will be running in-
dependently in the analyzer module of all machines in the
big data cluster. Every process output, procnew, from the
HotSpot VM is grabbed by the analyzer module of the pro-
posed system and profiled based on the control flow instruc-
tions present in its assembly code. Line by line analysis of
procnew is conducted and each instruction instr is matched
with the set of control flow instructions available in the
instruction set of the processor architecture. For this work,
we used only the most prominent control flow instructions
of Intel’s x86 architecture i.e. jumps, calls and returns. When
an instr in the code of the procnew is a control flow instruc-
tion, it gets added to the corresponding sequence string.
The seqarray represents the array of individual control flow
instruction sequences in the process procnew. This array is
used later as input while generating the hashes for each
control sequence string. All fixed length hash outputs are
combined as hashhashes and rehashed to generate a final
hash called msg that represents the program. This msg is
then shared with all replicas running the same program
using the secure communication protocol described above.
The second step in our attack detection algorithm is a
consensus algorithm similar to the extended 2-phase com-
mit protocol [38]. In this step, the node with primary copy
of data acts as coordinator and requests all replica nodes,
that act as workers, to confirm if their local hash of hashes,
(msg) of a particular process matches exactly with the coor-
dinator’s version. The coordinator then decides on the safety
of the process depending on the acknowledgments received
from participating replica nodes. A process is considered
to be safe by the coordinator if and only if it receives safe
acknowledgments from all of the workers. At the end of
process profiling step, encrypted message msge is shared
by coordinator node with all worker nodes. The nodes
that receive such messages will decrypt the message with
their currently active private key. The decrypted message is
essentially the hash of hashes of the three control instruction
sequence strings. This decrypted hash of hashes can be
directly compared to the local version of the same process
to detect the possibility of an attack. If the result of such
8Algorithm 4 Consensus
for all node ∈ replicas do
confirmationnode ← get confirmation about process p
from replica
if confirmationnode ∈ safe then
countsafe ← countsafe + 1
end if
end for
if countsafe ∈ countreplicas then
attack ← no
else
attack ← yes
masternode ← recovery(p)
end if
comparison of strings is a perfect match, then that indicates
that the same process (with the same code) was run on both
nodes. This indicates a safe process unless both nodes of the
cluster are attacked the same way, in which case it will be
a false positive. A confirmation message about the result of
the hash comparison will be sent to the coordinator node as
response to the original incoming message. The coordinator
node will wait to receive responses from all replicas in
order to arrive at a conclusion about the possibility of an
attack in a process. The given big data system is safe as
long as all the replicas respond with a safe confirmation. A
single unsafe response will mean that the system is under
attack. Algorithms 3 and 4 give more details about the hash
matching and consensus steps that take place in step 2 of
the attack detection algorithm. A pictorial representation of
the steps involved in our 2-step attack detection algorithm
is given in Figure 4. This figure represents a big data
system with a replication factor of 3 and hence there is one
coordinator (represented with a dark black shadow below
the node) and two workers. Active communication channels
are represented using a dotted line while the regular lines
between nodes represent passive communication channel.
The blue dotted loop around each node in step 1 and 3 of
the figure represent local computations.
Algorithm 3 is used in the hash matching step of the
attack detection algorithm. When a worker node, nodek
receives msgp from the coordinator node about a process
p, it will decrypt that message using its current private key,
privk and stores the result as hashhashes(receivedp). The
local version of the same string i.e. hashhashes(localp) will
be compared against the hashhashes(receivedp) to identify
similarity between local and received hash of a process. The
result of this hash matching is sent back as confirmation to
the coordinator node, main. The value of confirmation is
safe in case of a perfect match of hashes and unsafe otherwise.
Algorithm 4 is used by the coordinator node to identify
an attack, with the help of worker nodes. After step 1, the
coordinator node waits for responses from all the recipients.
The worker nodes respond with a confirmation message
that says whether the process is safe or unsafe. If the count
of number of safe responses i.e. countsafe from worker
nodes matches with the count of number of nodes in the
replica set i.e. countreplicas, the coordinator node assumes
that there is no attack in the current process p and resets the
attack variable. Else, if a mismatch in the process analysis
Fig. 5. Elements in a Model of the Proposed System Architecture
is observed, the attack variable is set and the masternode is
notified about the possibility of an attack in process p.
4.3 Model of the Proposed System Architecture
The proposed security system is a combination of 3 parts:
secure communication protocol, process profiling and hash
matching. As shown in Figure 3, these three parts are made
of multiple modules that need to be installed on all nodes
in the big data system. Also, locality of these modules
impacts the performance of the system greatly. The closer
they are to the main processor of a node, the faster and less
expensive it will be to communicate. But from a security
standpoint, these modules need to be isolated from the big
data system main workflow. Hence we designed a model for
the proposed system that can fit on isolated special purpose
security hardware chips. Such chips can be built on top of
existing security hardware such as TPM or Intel’s TXT chips
[10], [11]. Hardware solutions are popularly known to affect
the scalability and flexibility of the big data infrastructure,
comparing to a software solution which can be very adap-
tive. But in this case, we avoid such problems by decoupling
our solution from the workflow of a big data platform. There
will be a one-time extra cost due to the hardware security
modules. An overview of the elements in such a model of
the proposed system is given in Figure 5. The functionality
of each of these elements is as follows:
• Analyzer, this module will get the data from the
hotspot VM and perform the initial steps of cleaning
the data. Result from analyzer is stored in Memory.
• CFI filter, this module takes input, a set of assem-
bly language instructions, from the Analyzer module
(technically, the Memory module) and filters out the
control flow instructions, while maintaining the or-
der.
• Sequencers, there are three sequencers in our model,
one each for jumps, calls and returns. Each sequencer
9goes through the output of CFI filter module and
forms a delimited sequence string of the instruction it
is associated with. Then, the sequencer uses the SHA
hasher module to generate and store a fixed length
hash output from the variable length instruction
sequence string.
• Register Array, there are 4 registers in this array to
store message, jump instruction hash, call instruction
hash and return instruction hash.
• Message Register, this is a special register in the
Register Array used to store the message in thread-
safe manner.
• Message Generator, this module combines all the
individual hash outputs stored in registers and uses
the SHA hasher module to generate a fixed length
hash output. This hash of hashes is combined with
the process metadata to generate and store a message
that represents the process.
• Encryptor / Decryptor, this module uses the Key
Store to access the current set of public/private keys
and the Message Register to access the current process
message. The Encryptor module uses the public key
of a replica node from the Key Store and encrypts the
message in Message Register. The decryptor module
uses the private key of the node from the Key Store to
decrypt an incoming message.
• Comparator, this module performs string compar-
ison between local message (hash of hashes) and
received message.
• Key Generator, this module uses the underlying
TPM/TXT chip’s [10], [11] in-built functionality. The
hardwired key and the random number generator
of the security chip are used to generate a new
public/private key pair; and the timer of the chip
to trigger this action periodically.
• Key Store, this module uses an array of memory
locations to store the public key queues of all replica
nodes and the current public / private key pair of
this node. The three most recent public keys of each
replica node is stored in its queue.
• Exchanger, this module uses TCP/IP protocol to
exchange messages with other nodes.
5 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section we describe the experimental setup, explain
in detail about our choice of experiments and analyze the
results. The hadoop security design specifies that a 3%
slowdown in performance is permissible for any newly
proposed security solutions [31]. Hence, it is important for
the proposed system to offer both theoretical correctness
and feasibility in practical implementation and usage. Se-
curity in big data systems is a new area that does not
have set standards and specifically designed open-source
benchmarks to evaluate the overhead. Hence, we had to
handpick a set of general big data benchmark programs that
are relevant and provided by the big data community to test
the efficiency of our proposed security system.
5.1 Setup
The 3 big data services used for our experiments are:
TABLE 1
Amazon EC2 instance types
Attribute Value
Instance Model t2.micro m1.large
Processor Intel Xeon with
Turbo
Intel Xeon
E5-2650
Compute Units 1 (Burstable) 4
vCPU 1 2
Memory (GB) 1 7.5
Storage (SSD) Elastic Block Store Elastic Block
Store
Networking
Performance
low moderate
Operating System Linux/UNIX Linux/UNIX
Hadoop distribution 2.7.1 2.7.1
Spark distribution N/A 1.6
• Hadoop [4], the most popular implementation of a
big data framework that is maintained by the Apache
open-source community. It allows storing and pro-
cessing of large date using programming models
such as MapReduce.
• Spark [5], a fast and general engine for large-scale
data processing that is supposedly much faster than
Hadoop and it is maintained by the Apache open-
source community as well.
• Amazon web services (AWS) [39], [40], [41], a perfect
example of real-world big data system. AWS pro-
vides Elastic Cloud Compute (EC2) service that al-
lows users to use Amazon cloud’s compute capacity
depending on their needs. EC2 presents a true virtual
computing environment. Storage for the EC2 nodes
is provided by Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS)
which offers persistent storage. EBS volumes are
automatically replicated to protect user from compo-
nent failure, offering high availability and durability.
We used AWS supported hadoop and spark clusters for
conducting our experiments. The Hadoop Cluster that we
used is a 5 node cluster built using basic t2.micro nodes of
Amazon EC2 and EBS. Each node is equipped with only
1 vCPU and 1GB memory. The network performance is
minimal for this cluster. The Spark Cluster that we used is a 4
node cluster built using general purpose m1.large nodes of
Amazon EC2 and EBS. Each node is equipped with 2 vCPU
and 7.5GB memory. Network performance is moderate for
this cluster. Both cluster configurations satisfy the minimum
requirement to support replication factor of 3. The hardware
and software configurations of the EC2 nodes can be found
in table 1. We built a 64-bit Ubuntu AMI (Amazon Machine
Instance) for each node-type before setting up the clusters.
These AMIs were equipped with the latest distributions of
Hadoop, Spark and GCC along with with our code base.
The hadoop cluster had 5 nodes, where 1 node acted as
the namenode, 1 node acted as the secondary name node
and 3 nodes were acting as data nodes. The spark cluster
had a master and 3 slave nodes. Since our proposed system
works independently, all modules of the model had to be
installed on every node of the EC2 clusters. A library of all
modules in the model was implemented in C++ program-
ming language using STL and multi-threading libraries and
packaged together. Our code used TCP/IP protocol and SSH
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TABLE 2
List of Hadoop Map Reduce Examples
Exp.no Name Description
1 aggre-
gate-
word-
count
An Aggregate-based map/reduce
program that counts the words in the
input files.
2 aggre-
gate-
wordhist
An Aggregate-based map/reduce
program that computes the histogram of
the words in the input files.
3 bbp A map/reduce program that uses
Bailey-Borwein-Plouffe to compute exact
digits of Pi.
4 distbbp A map/reduce program that uses a
BBP-type formula to compute exact bits
of Pi.
5 grep A map/reduce program that counts the
matches of a regex in the input.
6 pi A map/reduce program that estimates Pi
using a quasi-Monte Carlo method.
7 random-
tex-
twriter
A map/reduce program that writes 10GB
of random textual data per node.
8 ran-
domwriter
A map/reduce program that writes 10GB
of random data per node.
9 sort A map/reduce program that sorts the
data written by the random writer.
10 teragen Generate data for the terasort.
11 terasort Run the terasort.
12 teravali-
date
Check the results of the terasort.
13 word-
count
A map/reduce program that counts the
words in the input files.
14 word-
mean
A map/reduce program that counts the
average length of the words in the input
files.
15 wordme-
dian
A map/reduce program that counts the
median length of the words in the input
files.
16 word-
standard-
deviation
A map/reduce program that counts the
standard deviation of the length of the
words in the input files.
keys for communication between the nodes of the clusters.
Though the main requirement for any attack detection
service is to be able to detect an attack successfully, being
able to detect the attack before the attacked program com-
pletes execution is also a necessity. We show the efficiency
and the overhead of the proposed system by conducting the
experiments in real-time using popular examples and tests.
We used two sets of open-source big data benchmark pro-
grams: (a) 16 Hadoop MapReduce Examples: that are provided
in the Apache hadoop installation kit; and (b) 16 Spark-
perf MLlib Tests: for machine learning algorithms given in
the spark performance test suite by Databricks [42]. More
details about these examples and tests are given in tables 2
and 3.
The input to our model (built from the proposed system)
is the run-time assembly code of a program. The hadoop
mapreduce examples were coded in Java and the Spark-perf
MLlib tests were coded in Scala. So, the jars to run these
examples were built using just-in-time compiling. Their
bytecodes are insufficient to create the assembly codes
of the individual programs. We used a software called
jit-watch [43] to generate the assembly codes (Intel x86
specification) of the programs from the jars. Since our
algorithm only needs control-flow instructions from the
TABLE 3
List of Spark-Perf MLlib Tests
Exp.no Name Description
1 fp-growth Frequent Pattern Matching Tests to
find frequent item sets
2 word2vec Feature Transformation Tests for
distributed presentation of words
3 chi-sq-
feature
Statistic Toolkit Tests using Chi-square
for correlation
4 spearman Statistic Toolkit Tests using Spearman’s
Correlation
5 pearson Statistic Toolkit Tests using Pearson’s
Correlation
6 block-
matrix-
mult
Matrix Multiplication on distributed
matrix
7 summary-
statistics
Linear Algebra Tests using Summary
Statistics (min, max, ...)
8 pca Linear Algebra Tests using Principal
Component Analysis
9 svd Linear Algebra Tests using Singular
Value Decomposition
10 gmm Clustering Tests using Gaussian
Mixture Model
11 kmeans Clustering Tests using K-Means
clustering
12 als Recommendation Tests using
Alternating Least Squares
13 decision-
tree
Random Forest Decision Tree
14 naive-
bayes
Classification Tests using Naive Bayes
15 glm-
classification
Generalized Linear Classification
Model
16 glm-
regression
Generalized Linear Regression Model
generated assembly code outputs of each program, we used
a custom parser that can filter out control flow instructions
from the native files. All 32 example programs are infected
by a code snippet that calls a function foo to print a line to
the console and involves a total of 3 call instructions and
1 return instruction. The command used for generating
assembly code output of JVM (or Hotspot VM) when
running the program is:
java -XX:+UnlockDiagnosticVMOptions
-XX:+PrintAssembly -XX:PrintAssemblyOptions=intel
-XX:+TraceClassLoading -XX:+LogCompilation
-XX:LogFile=filename -cp [path to additional
classes] [main method] [args]
First, we calculated the execution times for the hadoop
mapreduce examples on the hadoop cluster. Then we
studied the run times of the implemented model while it
was analyzing the assembly codes of the driver programs of
the same examples. These experiments are adhoc because
the input arguments for some of the experiments were
intentionally low to simulate worst case scenario’s where
the process takes very less time to execute. To meet the
input data requirements of the mapreduce examples, we put
the configuration file data from etc folder of hadoop into
HDFS. The generic command used to run these mapreduce
examples is:
time hadoop jar hadoop-mapreduce-examples.jar
[main method] [args]
The spark-perf MLlib tests on the spark cluster were
conducted the same way the mapreduce examples were
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TABLE 4
Hadoop Map Reduce Examples - Instruction level properties
Exp.no Example Instruction Count CFI Jumps Calls Returns %CFI % Jumps % Calls % Returns
1 aggregatewordcount 81713 17195 12722 4009 464 21.04% 15.57% 4.91% 0.57%
2 aggregatewordhist 48428 9812 7133 2366 313 20.26% 14.73% 4.89% 0.65%
3 bbp 85514 17880 13182 4211 487 20.91% 15.42% 4.92% 0.57%
4 distbbp 68283 13880 10234 3238 408 20.33% 14.99% 4.74% 0.60%
5 grep 81404 16911 12501 3937 473 20.77% 15.36% 4.84% 0.58%
6 pi 65397 13607 10170 3070 367 20.81% 15.55% 4.69% 0.56%
7 randomtextwriter 70909 14896 11186 3332 378 21.01% 15.78% 4.70% 0.53%
8 randomwriter 91414 19462 14508 4475 479 21.29% 15.87% 4.90% 0.52%
9 sort 101298 21420 16003 4885 532 21.15% 15.80% 4.82% 0.53%
10 teragen 134747 28228 21013 6516 699 20.95% 15.59% 4.84% 0.52%
11 terasort 121541 25420 18925 5827 668 20.91% 15.57% 4.79% 0.55%
12 teravalidate 139583 29244 21838 6630 776 20.95% 15.65% 4.75% 0.56%
13 wordcount 77393 16341 12100 3791 450 21.11% 15.63% 4.90% 0.58%
14 wordmean 62412 13093 9726 2994 373 20.98% 15.58% 4.80% 0.60%
15 wordmedian 66401 13435 9869 3161 405 20.23% 14.86% 4.76% 0.61%
16 wordstandarddeviation 82079 16917 12492 3932 493 20.61% 15.22% 4.79% 0.60%
Average Values 86157 17984 13350 4148 485 20.83% 15.45% 4.81% 0.57%
TABLE 5
Spark Performance Test ML Algorithms - Instruction level properties
Exp.no Algorithm Instruction Count CFI Jumps Calls Returns % CFI % Jumps % Calls % Returns
1 fp-growth 216009 46544 35200 10251 1093 21.55% 16.30% 4.75% 0.51%
2 word2vec 147737 30235 22638 6772 825 20.47% 15.32% 4.58% 0.56%
3 chi-sq-feature 172014 35783 26736 8119 928 20.80% 15.54% 4.72% 0.54%
4 spearman 194615 41043 30857 9155 1031 21.09% 15.86% 4.70% 0.53%
5 pearson 184628 38694 28996 8691 1007 20.96% 15.71% 4.71% 0.55%
6 block-matrix-mult 195714 41245 31030 9174 1041 21.07% 15.85% 4.69% 0.53%
7 summary-statistics 196555 41034 30736 9235 1063 20.88% 15.64% 4.70% 0.54%
8 pca 192280 40427 30377 9020 1030 21.03% 15.80% 4.69% 0.54%
9 svd 143996 29684 22334 6550 800 20.61% 15.51% 4.55% 0.56%
10 gmm 170722 35655 26848 7898 909 20.88% 15.73% 4.63% 0.53%
11 kmeans 170694 35842 26957 7962 923 21.00% 15.79% 4.66% 0.54%
12 als 181836 38032 28603 8428 1001 20.92% 15.73% 4.63% 0.55%
13 decision-tree 175889 36655 27546 8140 969 20.84% 15.66% 4.63% 0.55%
14 naive-bayes 171945 36053 27036 8082 935 20.97% 15.72% 4.70% 0.54%
15 glm-classification 186454 39088 29362 8715 1011 20.96% 15.75% 4.67% 0.54%
16 glm-regression 200255 42439 32020 9346 1073 21.19% 15.99% 4.67% 0.54%
Average Values 181334 38028 28580 8471 977 20.95% 15.74% 4.67% 0.54%
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(b) Spark-Perf Machine Learning Tests
Fig. 6. Consistent Distribution of CFI in the Programs used for Experimental Evaluation
tested. But here the inputs for the tests were predetermined
by the benchmark provider in the config.py script. The
generic command used to run these MLlib tests is:
spark-submit --class mllib.perf.TestRunner
--master [ip of node] --driver-memory
[limit] mllib-perf-tests-assembly.jar
[algorithm name] [args]
12
TABLE 6
Run Time Analysis for Proposed system to analyze and compare
Hadoop MapReduce Examples
Exp.no Time to
Execute
Time to
Detect
%
Overhead
1 17.56 0.69 3.93%
2 20.14 0.42 2.10%
3 6.39 0.76 11.84%
4 287.62 0.67 0.23%
5 7.96 0.79 9.89%
6 6.48 0.72 11.12%
7 37.63 0.77 2.05%
8 31.51 0.97 3.07%
9 41.71 1.57 3.75%
10 4.45 1.46 32.82%
11 4.99 1.37 27.37%
12 4.61 1.47 31.96%
13 6.68 0.99 14.86%
14 6.63 0.90 13.63%
15 6.64 0.92 13.82%
16 7.76 1.08 13.88%
Average
Values
31.17 0.97 3.12%
5.2 Results and Analysis
The experiments we used for evaluating our proposed
security system comprise of stress tests and performance
benchmarks of hadoop and spark. Hence, knowing which
threads of investigation to follow and which to ignore was
difficult and challenging. We chose to focus on execution
time and code size of the experiments. The overhead in
our experiments is calculated from time measurements. We
divide the time taken to detect an attack in a process p by the
execution time of the same process and multiply the result
by 100 to find the percentage of time overhead, as given
in equation 1. Here timedetect(p) is calculated using system
clock measurements for encrypting process analysis infor-
mation, decrypting received messages and hash matching.
The communication cost in sending data packets from one
node to another is not included. The overhead calculations
show the worst case scenario since the input arguments are
intentionally low for some of the experiments. Real-world
big data programs will be much more complex jobs and
hence the overhead will be much lesser than what is shown
here. Tables 6 and 7 and Figures 7a and 7b show the analysis
of run-times for executing the experiments and the model
built from the proposed system. On average, the overhead
of running the model is 3.28%. We used linear regression
and best-fit plots, given in Figures 8a and 8b, to show the
relation between programs (given in number of control flow
instructions of their assembly representations) and time to
detect an attack in them. The time taken to execute example
number 4 i.e. distributed bbp program of hadoop mapreduce
example set was too high (288 seconds) to plot on the graph
shown in Figure 7a.
%overhead(p) =
timedetect(p)
timeexecute(p)
× 100 (1)
The proposed system performs a similarity check of
control flow within duplicate processes running on different
nodes of a big data cluster. This control flow similarity check
is performed by matching control instruction sequences.
TABLE 7
Run Time Analysis for Proposed system to analyze and compare
Spark-perf MLlib Tests
Exp.no Time to
Execute
Time to
Detect
%
Overhead
1 2.92 0.34 11.67%
2 12.942 0.24 1.87%
3 3.899 0.28 7.19%
4 15.708 0.33 2.08%
5 3.314 0.31 9.23%
6 3.011 0.34 11.31%
7 5.312 0.35 6.63%
8 8.124 0.34 4.23%
9 24.647 0.30 1.21%
10 4.584 0.33 7.24%
11 7.529 0.35 4.69%
12 16.884 0.36 2.12%
13 31.963 0.37 1.17%
14 1.664 0.37 22.34%
15 8.151 0.41 5.05%
16 8.542 0.45 5.26%
Average
Values
9.950 0.34 3.44%
Since the infected node is predetermined in our experi-
ments, our test cases do not have a false positive or false
negative. But a false positive will occur when all data nodes
are attacked in the same way. A false negative will occur
in case of runtime attacks or attacks that originate outside
the big data platform. But given our attack model, such
cases are outside the scope of this work. Instead, we try
to understand the control flow in the programs used in
the experiments section, i.e. hadoop mapreduce examples
and the spark performance tests for machine learning algo-
rithms. Results from tables 4 and 5 and fugures 6a and 6b
show instruction level properties of the examples and tests
used in our experiments. It can be observed that only 20.8%
of the total instruction count in the hadoop mapreduce
examples account for control flow instructions. In case of
spark performance tests for machine learning algorithms,
20.9% of instructions in the assembly code are control flow
instructions. Of all control flow instructions, jumps are the
most significantly used CFI with a lion share of 15.45% of the
total instruction count in hadoop mapreduce examples and
15.74% of the total instruction count in spark performance
tests. Calls and returns cover only 4.8% and 0.5% re-
spectively in the hadoop mapreduce example set and; 4.6%
and 0.5% respectively in the spark performance tests set.
It can be inferred from these results that control flow
instructions account for only one-fifth of the total instruction
count for a program (assembly code). This is a remarkable
coincidence among these two sets of programs because (a)
they belong to different domains - mapreduce on hadoop,
machine learning in spark; (b) their source programming
language is different - java for hadoop mapreduce examples,
scala for spark-perf machine learning tests; and (c) they
differ in program size - 86,000 instructions on average per
program for the mapreduce example set and 180,000 instruc-
tions on average per program for the spark perf machine
learning tests. This observation strengthens our initial argu-
ment that generating dynamic CFG for large and complex
big data programs is cumbersome. This is because the size
of CFG is proportional to the code lines which is related
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Fig. 7. Run-time Analysis of Hadoop and Spark programs
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Fig. 8. Time Forecast Plots (best-fit regression) of the Model built from Proposed System
to the number of instructions. Hence, the proposed idea of
generating CIS and hashing them is a good alternative to the
CFG memory complexity problem. The overhead incurred
in using the model built from the proposed system architec-
ture is less than 3.28% if it is hosted by the same hardware
that hosts the big data systems. This is in the acceptable
range of overhead for big data platforms like Hadoop. The
time our system takes to analyze the programs and compare
the results is linearly dependent on the number of control
flow instructions in the program, but not on the number of
lines of assembly code. This greatly reduces the complexity
of the similarity analysis from the conventional and complex
approach of generating a CFG. Also, generating CIS only
needs a one time parse through the program code (assembly
code) and can be performed independently and in parallel
on each node of the cluster. The experimental results show
the feasibility of implementing a model of the proposed
system. Building and implementing a detailed version of
this system will demonstrate lower overhead and convince
the vendors to adopt it.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a security system for big data
systems to detect insider attacks quickly with low overhead.
The system consists of a two step attack detection algorithm
and a secure communication protocol. A simple hash string
matching technique is proposed to fulfill the distributed
process similarity check and identify attacks. A secure com-
munication protocol for data nodes that uses periodically
generated random keys is proposed to conduct the detection
algorithm. A model of the proposed system is tested in
real-time on Amazon’s EC2 clusters using a different sets
of Hadoop and Spark programs. The time overhead was
3.28% and it is observed from the results that the proposed
security system uses only 20% of program code to detect
attacks. In this work, we also propose the idea of delegating
security as an independent module and the components
needed for such models are discussed. For future work, we
would like to evaluate our system on security related big
data benchmarks (when available). Also, we would like to
actualize the hardware architecture of security chips that can
independently support our system.
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